Table of Contents

Framework 2

Contention 4

Theoretical Specifications 5

1AR T FLs 8

1AR Meta Theory 9

1AR AFF Choice 10

CX F/O Explanation 11

1AR FW Weighing 12

Constitutivism 12

A2 Actor Specificity 12

A2 Personhood 12

# Framework

I value obligations since the resolution questions what a country should do. **The standard is** **respect for the generic rights to freedom and well-being**

Normativity, as a guide to behavior, is obligatory for all agents, so it must prevent agents from being able to rationally reject its principles. The “normative structure of action” provides the basis for constructing such a principle. Gewirth[[1]](#footnote-1) How do the concepts of reason and action fulfill the justificatory task I have assigned to them in relation to the supreme principle of morality? Let us begin by recalling that the answer to the authoritative question of **moral philosophy must** **indicate why action** in accordance with a certain moral criterion **is** categorically **obligatory** in that its requiredness cannot rightly be evaded by any action or institution Now such an answer is **obtainable if** a supreme moral principle can be shown to be logically necessary so that its denial is self-contradictory. For since the principle says that actions of a certain kind ought to be performed**,** the fact that the principle is necessarily trueprovide**s** a conclusive justificatory reason for believing that the kinds of action the principle says ought to be performed ought indeed to be performed. But to have such a reason for believing this about certain actions is also to have a conclusive justificatory reason for doing the actions, so that **the principle's normative necessity**, whereby its requirements for action cannot rightly be evaded, **follows from** its **being logically necessary**. For if one is conclusively justified in believing that one ought to do X, then, at least so far as concerns the ascertainable grounds for one's action, one is conclusively justified in doing X. And it is only by deductive rationality that such necessary truth can be established. This brief answer incurs various difficulties about the relations between logical and moral necessity, and between reasons for believing and for doing. Waiving these for the present, I wish to emphasize a further gap whose bridging will show the central importance of the concept of action for the justificatory project. It is possible for a proposition or principle to be necessarily true only within the context of a system of arbitrary definitions and axioms from which it can be shown to follow by rigorous deductive reasoning, so that to affirm the premises and to deny the conclusion is to incur self-contradiction. But the premises need not themselves be necessarily true. Hence, the proposition would have only a kind of formal or relative necessity, as logically following from the systems premises; yet the system as a whole would be only contingent because it would have logically possible alternatives: its premises could be denied without self-contradiction. Indeed, the premises themselves may be false, and also the conclusions. If. then, the supreme principle of morality is to emerge as a necessarily true justification by a deductive argument, it seems that the formal necessity of its being entailed or deductively implied by various premises is not sufficient; there will also have to be a material necessity of the premises themselves. The content as well as the form of the justificatory argument will have to be necessary and not men contingent, let alone arbitrary or false.¶ The need for such necessary content also follows from the concept of morality itself. As we have seen, judgments of moral obligation are categorical in that **what persons morally ought to do** set**s** requirements for them **that they** cannot rightly evade by consulting their own self-interested desires or **variable opinions, ideals, or institutional practices** For moral judgments are critically evaluative of all of these. But such inescapable obligations cannot be derived from variable contents. Moreover, ultimate moral disagreements can be rationally resolved only if moral obligations are based on necessary contents. Forif moral principles have contingent contents, so that their obligatoriness may vary with the variable desires or opinions of different protagonists, then no finality can be rationally imposed  their **differing** moral **beliefs.** To ascertain which among the various possible or actual moral principles are right or correct hence demands that one adopt a standpoint that is superior to these variable elements, so that it can be seen to impose rational requirements on them. Such a superior standpoint, to avoid the variability and relativism of the subject matter to which it is addressed, must have a rational necessity of content as well as of form. But how can such contentual necessity be established by reason? In answer this question, the subject matter of morality must be considered; this consideration, being performed through conceptual¶ analysis, is itself a product of reason in the sense of deductive rationality. It there is a subject matter with which all moralities and moral judgments must be concerned directly or indirectly then this will provide a necessary content for all such judgments. If it can be further shown that this content has certain determinate logical confluences regarding the criteria of moral rightness, then the principle that upholds these criteria will emerge as materially or contentually as well as formally necessary. The subject matter of morality will thus be at least part of the justification of the supreme moral principle; and since this justification is contentually necessary, so too will be the moral principle that is its justification.¶ This necessary content of morality is to be found in action and its generic features. For all moral precepts, regardless of their further contents, deal directly or indirectly with how persons ought to act. The specific modes of action required by different moral precepts are, of course, highly variable. But amid these variations, the precepts require actions; and **there are** certain **invariant features that pertain** genetically **to all actions**. I shall call these the generic features of action because they characterize the genus or category of action as a whole, as delimited by moral and other practical precepts. Thus, just as action provides the necessary content of all morality, so the generic features provide the necessary content of all action. ¶ It will be of the first importance to trace how these features determine the necessities of moral tightness, so that from the 'is of the generic features of action there is logically derivable the 'ought' of moral principles and rules. Insofar as these generic features of action constitute the justification of the supreme principle of morality, the latter, as their justification, will also have a necessary content. These generic features, in turn, are ascertained by deductive rationality, so that the ultimate justification of the supreme principle consists in reason.¶ Now just as the concept of **reason**, which I have confined to deduction and induction, **is morally neutral and** hence **not question-begging**, so too **the concept of action** that is to be used as the basis of the justificatory argument is morally neutral. For since this concept comprises the generic features of all action, it **fits all moralities rather than** reflecting or **deriving from any one** normative moral **position** as against any other. How, then, can it be shown that from such morally neutral premises there follow determinate, normatively moral conclusions about the necessary content of the supreme principle of morality? This question poses one of the major challenges the present work must meet. The answer consists in showing that, because of its generic features, action has what I shall call a 'normative structure,' evaluative and deontic judgments on the part of agents are logically implicit in all action; and when these judgments are subjected to certain rational requirements, a certain normative moral principle logically follows from them. To put it otherwise: Any agent, simply by virtue of being an agent, must admit., on pain of self-contradiction, that he ought to act in certain determinate ways.¶ The relation of action to morality bears importantly on the question raised earlier about the correspondence-correlates moral judgments must have if they are to be true by virtue of correspondence. Since action comprises the factual subject matter of moral and other practical precepts, it [serves for moral philosophy a function analogous to that which empirical observational data may be held to serve[s] for natural science: that of providing an objective basis or subject matter against which, respectively, moral judgments or rules and empirical statements or laws can be checked tor their truth or correctness. It must be emphasized that this function is only analogous: a moral judgment does not become true simply by stating that some action or kind of action is actually performed. As we shall see, it is rather that action, through its generic features and normative structure, entails certain requirements on the part of agents, and moral judgments are true insofar as they correspond to these requirements and hence to the normative structure of action. But because action provides the necessary content of moral judgments, these are not left, so far as concerns truth, completely unsupported by relevant objective standards or data. Although the importance of action for moral philosophy has been recognized since the ancient Greeks, it has not hitherto been noted that the nature of action enters into the very com justification of the supreme principle of morality.

This means frameworks contingent on factors agents can disagree about, such as desires or institutional factors should be rejected since it cannot ground a view any agent must accept and err aff on the framework debate because the normative structure of action is formulated from precepts that are true of all moral theories regardless of their content.

In acting an agent must take his or her purpose to be good and value their ends. Otherwise, the agent wouldn’t take the action in the first place- the purpose independent of the nature of justification wouldn’t be worth pursuing. Contained as a requirement in every action are the conditions for that action to occur, which the agent must hold to be good on pain of rational contradiction- or else their purposes wouldn’t be valuable. Independent of the reasons for acting, agents must value their ends or else they wouldn’t be moved from a stat of inaction because they wouldn’t consider their purpose worth pursuing.

Since agents must judge their purposes to be good they must also hold the conditions for those actions to be good, or they must contradict their view that their purposes are valuable.Gewirth[[2]](#footnote-2) 2

Let me briefly sketch the main line of argument that leads to this conclusion. As I have said, the argument is based on the generic features of human action. To begin with, every agent acts for purposes he regards as good. Hence, he must regard as necessary goods the freedom and well being that are the generic features and **necessary** conditions of his action and successful action in general. From this, it follows that every agent logically must hold or accept that he has rights to these conditions. For **if he were to deny that** he has **these rights, then** he would have to admit that it is permissible for other persons to remove from him the very conditions of freedom and well-being that, as an agent, he must have. But it is contradictory for him to hold both that he must have these conditions and also that he may not have them. Hence**, on pain of self-contradiction, every agent must accept** that **he has rights to freedom and well-being**. Moreover, every agent must further admit that all other agents also have those rights, since all other actual or prospective agents have the same general characteristics of agency on which he must ground his own right-claims.¶ What I am saying, then, is that **every agent,** simply **by virtue of being an agent, must regard his freedom and well being as necessary goods and** must **hold** that **he and all other** actual or prospective **agents have rights to these necessary goods**. Hence, every agent, on pain of self-contradiction, must accept the following principle: Act in accord with the generic rights of your recipients as well as of yourself. The generic rights are rights to the generic features of action, freedom, and well-being. I call this the Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC), because it combines the formal consideration of consistency with the material consideration of the generic features and rights of action

Gewirth indicates to be an agent is just to regard one’s own rights to freedom and well being as good and hold he and all others have the same rights. Only this constitutivist account of moral motivation provides agents with non-optional reasons for acting. Katsafanas[[3]](#footnote-3)

Enter a third theory, which attempts to do just that: constitutivism. According to constitutivism,there is an element of truth in both the internalist and the externalist positions. For the constitutivist agrees with the internalist thatthe truth of a normative claim depends on the agent’s aims, in the sense that the **[an] agent must possess a certain aim** in order **for the normative claim to be true.** But the constitutivist **[constitutivism] traces the authority of norms to an aim that** has a special status, an aim that **is constitutive of being an agent. This** constitutive **aim is not optional;** if you lack the aim, you are not an agent at all. So the constitutivist agrees with the internalist that practical reasons derive from the agent’s aims; but the constitutivist holds that **the relevant aim is one** that is **intrinsic to being an agent. Accordingly,** the constitutivist gets the conclusion that the externalist wanted: **there are non-optional reasons for acting.** Put differently, there are reasons for action that arise merely from the fact that one is an agent.

These necessary principles contained in the nature of action are freedom, which is the ability to choose purposes, and well-being, the ability to realize those purposes. *This also means* that my framework best accounts for the ontology of agency because the reality of an agent is on the most basic level characterized by being subject to a normative principle.Rights and duties are equivalent. For example, if Adam has a right to something, other agents have a correlative duty to respect that right. This yields the “principle of generic consistency” or PGC: respect thegeneric rights of freedom and well-being of yourself and others.

Next, impact calculus:

1. The PGC doesn’t confer a positive obligation upon states to promote rights to freedom and wellbeing. No state of affairs, like being born into poverty or slavery, is a violation of the PGC because it only applies to the reasoning behind an action so no collapse to consequentialism.

2.Intended harms outweigh foreseen harms- Intending a harm involves willing the necessary means to bring about that harm, but foreseeing a harm at most implies indifference about whether the harm occurs, as the occurrence of the harm is not part of your intention. Also preempts util- intended harms are worse than merely foreseen harms because to make a harm necessary is worse than to make it merely possible. This also means that foreseen harms are no one’s ground because they can be solved by extra-resolutional action – unlike intended harms, they are not made necessary by affirming or negating.

3. The PGC is distributive, NOT aggregative since it concerns equality between the agent and recipient rather than general ends. And, because self-contradiction gives rise to rights claims, maximizing rights isn’t relevant because it’s not *more* contradictory to disrespect the rights of two agents than one, no util

# Contention

Extracting resources is a violation of agents rights to feedom and wellbeing- it denies them ability to set ends and pursue the means to those ends. Rendall[[4]](#footnote-4)

**Intergenerational justice deals with our obligations to** past or **future generations**, particularly those with which our own lives do not overlap.  Certain actions – such as **cutting down forests or producing radioactive waste** – **let us make gains at our descendants’ expense**.  Tax cuts now, debt repayments later can be a winning formula for re-election, as recent U.S. history shows.  “In many intergenerational situations … it is less costly in the short term to ignore the problem,” observes Kimberly Wade-Benzoni.  “… In the long run, however, it ends up costing more – but those costs accrue to a different set of people.”  Intergenerational exploitation is particularly common in the environmental sphere.  Nuclear power raises many of the same distributive issues as nuclear deterrence.  We enjoy the electricity now; future generations face most of the risks. **We exploit our descendants by creating an externality in our favor, since “future generations must bear very significant costs without having received the benefits of the activities prior to the accident.”** So too with nuclear deterrence.  The objection that “no reasonable person with even a limited acquaintance with the history of human affairs over the last 3,000 years could be confident of safe storage by methods involving human intervention over the enormous time periods involved” applies at least as much to nuclear weapons as to nuclear waste.  Does any reasonable person, let alone a realist, expect deterrence to work for millennia without catastrophic “accidents”?

Thus agents in the future are denied their freedom, the ability to choose purposes, and well-being, or the abilities to realize purposes. Also outweighs neg offense- the violation is the worst because future generations are the most vulnerable. Agents in current generation are alive and have a chance of acting to ameliorate their situation and are thus include in willing the means to any end, whereas future generation don’t exist.

Next, To respect freedom and wellbeing, agents must value nature and reject instrumental use for personal ends. Devaluing nature creates a dualism that makes it impossible to explain the value of freedom and wellbeing, which violates the standard. Agents are natural beings by virtue of existing physical and the idea of being a rational actors implies this because it requires taking an action in the world. Thus agents are committed to recongizng that both reason and nature have value, the conclusion of which acting to our freedom and well being implies nature must be valuable in and of itself. McDowell[[5]](#footnote-5)“The threat is that an animal endowed with reason would be metaphysically split, with disastrous consequences for our reflection about empirical thinking and action. I have claimed that we can avoid the threat even while we maintain, unlike bald naturalism, that **the structure of the space of reasons is***sui generis*, **in comparison with the organization of the realm of law.** The **spontaneity** **of** the **understanding cannot be captured in terms** that are apt **for describing nature on that conception**, but even so it can permeate actualizations of our animal nature.”

# Theoretical Specifications

1. Presume aff in the absence of offense- the environment is an intrinsically valuable good accessible to everyone whereas resource extraction benefits the few. Impacts:

A. turns negative fairness arguments- abuse compensates me for an existent 7% neg bias[[6]](#footnote-6) so I’m just leveling the playing field

B. the neg must codify presumption arguments with empirics to back up theoretical claims, otherwise default aff because side bias is proven through win loss rations over 32,000 rounds

2. Denying a term or assumption in the resolution renders it nonsensical, not false. For instance, the statement “the King of France is bald” is neither true nor false because there is no King of France—the statement is merely irrelevant

3. Paradigm Issue:

A. Affirm if I win a counter interp or prove no abuse- that’s key to ensure proportional punishment on neg topicality and theory since the negative would only claim drop the debater if he was prepared for the entire round to collapse to that layer- that checks theory’s use as a strategic crutch and fosters topic debate. That proves uniqueness for the aff- the neg always has bidirectional interps, so deterrence is key. Additionally the aff is already deterred from reading bad theory because a minute of the 1AR is a quarter of the time but a minute of the 1N is a seventh, so there’s a structural check against abuse.

B. Presume the aff meet and drop the neg on unchecked theory interps- solves all abuse because I’m willing to clarify or modify parts of the AC which is unique since I speak first but the 1NC advocacy is in comparison to the aff’s so it’s fixed- and ensures the neg reads theory as an actual check on abuse and improves substance education- otherwise all neg abuse claims are self indicted AND

C. the Neg reading multiple shells without an RVI for me violates reciprocity- vote them down as a meta theory issues because it skews aff strategy to beat back multiple interps and not be able to weigh the RVI abuse story- also makes the round irresolvable- the judge can’t select his ballot to endorse multiple interpretations and picking between the two is vacuous- there is no independent metric to weigh abuse aside from intervention

4. View the resolution as a question of truth and falsity, not desirability. Key to text- to negate[[7]](#footnote-7) means **“to deny the** existence or **truth of,”,** so the most predictable distributions of burdens is truth and falsity since the text is all we have going into the round.

5. Paradigm issues are not indictable with theory- violations stem from arguments and interpretations but unidirectional spikes are not interps debaters can violate. Otherwise the round becomes irresolvable since debaters would loose for contesting competing interps or drop the debater- it’d spawn a theory debate above the existent theory debate, and so on to infinite regress.

Interpretations

1. Merriam-Webster[[8]](#footnote-8) defines prioritize as “to list or rate (as projects or goals) in order of priority” so prioritizing environmental protection over resource extraction means regarding environmental protection as a more important goal than resource extraction. Prioritizing environmental protection over resource extraction describes a state in which an agent—the developing country—regards environmental protection as more important than resource extraction. Nebel[[9]](#footnote-9)

I hear that many affirmatives on this topic defend the implementation of a particular policy or set of policies in developing countries. The classic framing of this issue has been in terms of an Aims vs. Implementation dichotomy, which has carried over from the Jan/Feb 2013 topic about valuing rehabilitation above retribution. In this article, I’ll explain why I think that is a false dichotomy, and how you can strategically get past this framing of the issue.  The most important word in the resolution, for the purposes of this disagreement, is ‘prioritize.’ This is because a topical affirmative advocacy has to do the thing that the resolution says ought to be done. In this case, that’s prioritization. Now, if you just stop there, you might have the following thought: if a topical advocacy just needs to prioritize environmental protection (EP) over resource extraction (RE), then implementing some particular policy that prioritizes EP over RE is, ceteris paribus, topical. But that’s not a good inference. The reason is that **what has to do the prioritizing** in order **to be topical is the** agent**.** Your advocacy must be that the agentprioritize EP over RE, whatever that means. In this case, that agent is ‘developing countries.**Just because an agent implements some policy** or set of policies **that prioritize[s] EP over RE does not mean** that **the agent itself prioritizes EP over RE**. This may seem like a picky distinction, but consider some examples. **Suppose I chose to spend time with my friends** tonight, **rather than work on a paper**. This choice might prioritize friendship over work. But **this** choice **does not make it the case that**I**prioritize friendship over work**. **I might** actually be the kind of person who **prioritize**s **work over friendship, so that I** almost **always choose to write a paper** when I could instead hang out with friends, **but this night** is the rare opportunity when **I hang out with my friends**. So, just because some choice or action prioritizes one thing over another does not entail that the agent prioritizes one thing over another. If we assume that an advocacy is topical only if it makes it the case that the agent does what the resolution says it ought to do, then this means that **implementing a particular policy that prioritizes EP over RE is not enough to be topical**. (That is, absent evidence about this policy having the effect of changing developing countries’ priorities as a whole. But then this advocacy might only be effects-topical.)

Prefer this interpretation:

A. Common Usage- the first result on 9 dictionaries[[10]](#footnote-10) defines prioritize as to rank in priority, not take an action. My interpretation is the most predictable because dictionary entries reflect how words are used in the real world. The Nebel evidence also indicates prioritize in the English language is evaluate in context of the agent- belief changes reflect prioritization, not individual actions. Predictability is key to fairness because it forms the basis of mutual pre round prep.

B. Predictable Limits- there are over 150 developing countries each with multiple extractive industries, ranging from natural gas to rare earth metals, and under a policy implementation only view the aff can defend any one of them. That massively underlimits, the topic, generating an infinite case list. My interp constrains the aff to defending the most significant policies in the lit that require changes in belief. Nebel 2

**People might respond with a definition of EP or RE in terms of policies**. This definition might show that the objects to be prioritized are sets of policies, or some common feature of policies, rather than an abstract aim. But the relevant question is not Aims vs. Implementation: that framing of the topic only persists because of Jan/Feb 2013, on which people defined 'rehabilitation' and 'retribution' as either an aim or a kind of policy. But Aims vs. Implementation is not the correct contrast. The correct contrasts are Aims vs. Policies, and Prioritization vs. Implementation. The point is that prioritizing some kind of policy is not the same as implementing some policy from that set. Aims vs. Policies is a matter of the direct object, whereas Prioritization vs. Implementation is a matter of the verb. **We can agree** that **EP and RE are sets or kinds of policies, but think** that **the resolution is about which we ought to prioritize, not which we ought to implement**.  However, this does not mean that the anti-policy side completely wins. People who wish to defend an anti-policy interpretation often make their interpretations too strong, by suggesting that no questions of implementation are relevant. That seems to me false. To see why, consider a variation on my earlier example about hanging out with my friends or writing a paper. Suppose I used to prioritize work over friendship, but I now prioritize friendship over work. It seems that I am now more likely to spend time with my friends, when this trades off with writing a paper, than I used to be. This is because **an agent’s priorities** shape her decisions. They **don’t**guarantee that **an agent will always choose any** particular **action that better reflects those priorities**. But they will lead to different patterns of actions on the whole. If this is right, then **the** most accurate **Aims-based interpretation** of the topic **allows that the affirmative advocacy**leads to**the implementation of policies that prioritize EP over RE as an effect**, although **the aff**irmative **can’t advocate any**particular **policy**. Implementation of particular policies is an effect, which can be used to garner advantages or disadvantages, but cannot be the affirmative advocacy. And **any** particular **effect** of that kind can only be known with some uncertain probability; it **cannot be assumed** to occur **as a matter of fiat.**

So, my compromise view is that **policy implementation is relevant in** the sense **that it’s an effect of the agent’s prioritization**. I now want to consider, though, a way in which the proponent of the anti-policy approach can make this effect irrelevant on the impact level, rather than the link level. By the impact level, I mean whether the effect matters, or is normatively relevant. By the link level, I mean whether the effect happens as a result of the affirmative advocacy. I’m considering a way to concede that the effect happens, but dispute that it is relevant.

Limits are key to fairness- ensures equal research burdens and division of ground and key to education- incentivizes topical research and depth of education.

2. Should is defined as a guideline for action, when the action of the resolution is permissible. Blumenthal[[11]](#footnote-11)  
When writing quality management system (QMS) documents that state requirements, most of us have used auxiliary verbs such as *will, shall, may, might, should*, and *can*.¶ An auxiliary verb “helps to form the voices, modes, and tenses of other verbs” (1). In the world of standards and regulations**, the choice of** an **auxiliary verb** in a sentence **affects the intensity of a requirement**. Although the words, themselves, do not occupy much space in a sentence, misusing them can cause significant misunderstanding of a QMS document. Each sentence below delivers a distinct message, even when one appears to be essentially synonymous with another. Incoming materials are inspected before they are accepted in warehouse. Incoming materials may be inspected before they are accepted in warehouse. Incoming materials must be inspected before they are accepted in warehouse. Incoming materials shall be inspected before they are accepted in warehouse. Incoming materials should be inspected before they are accepted in warehouse. Incoming materials will be inspected before they are accepted in warehouse. Among auxiliary verbs commonly used in QMS documents, the difference between*shall*and*should*is sometimes overlooked. When used as an auxiliary verb,***shall***, according to*Webster's Online Dictionary,*“denotes a requirement that is mandatory whenever the criterion for conformance with the specification requires that there be no deviation” (2). This word **implies obligation** **and is traditionally used by laws and regulations**. **For example**, Chapter V of **the***Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (****FD&C Act****)*, “Drugs and Devices,” **begins with** the following: “**A drug** or device **shall be deemed to be adulterated** –” (3). Similarly, the **FDA’s regulations frequently use *shall* to indicate mandatory requirements**. In*CFR - Code of Federal Regulations Title 21*, Part 803, the regulation for medical device reporting, the English reporting requirement states: “All reports required in this part which are submitted in writing or electronic equivalent shall be submitted to FDA in English” (4). On the other hand,***should* “denotes a guideline** or recommendation **whenever noncompliance with the specification is permissible**.” When used as an auxiliary verb, it expresses “a conditional or contingent act or state … or moral obligation” (5). The statement “Incoming materials shall be inspected before they are accepted in warehouse” is mandatory. All incoming materials must be inspected before they are accepted in warehouse. A deviation causes a noncompliance with the document. In contrast, “**Incoming materials should be inspected** before they are accepted in warehouse” **is a recommendation** by the document writer. It allows the document users to make their own judgment calls. In reality, the incoming materials will most likely be inspected before they are accepted. However, the document users at any time can make a deviation based on the specific situation, as long as the decision making is reasonable and logical. (Recall also that the word*should*does imply moral obligation.) Such deviation does not violate the document’s requirement. Because of the built-in flexibility of the word, if the document writer intends to mandate a requirement,*should*is not an appropriate choice.

Prefer:

A. Common Usage: English speaks most commonly use should to denote less than an obligation. Words and Phrases[[12]](#footnote-12) ‘06

C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1999. Common meaning of the term "should" suggests or recommends a course of action, while ordinary understanding of "shall" describes a course of action that is mandatory, and, in absence of clear manifestation of intent on part of Sentencing Commission to attribute to "should" a meaning contrary to the common one, the term should be given its usual meaning when interpreting sentencing guidelines and application notes. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 et seq., 18 U.S.C.A.—U.S. v. Maria, 186 F.3d 65.— Sent & Pun 661, 665.

B. Textual precision- should functions as a judgment between a range of possibilities and recommends one action without wholly excluding each other- that’s the Blumenthal evidence. IEEE[[13]](#footnote-13) confirms  
The wordshall**indicates mandatory requirements** strictly to be followed in order to conform to the standard and from which no deviation is permitted (shall equalsis required to). The wordshould**indicates** **that** **among several possibilities one is recommended** as particularly suitable, **without mentioning or excluding others**; **or that a certain** course of **action is preferred but not necessarily required** (should equalsis recommended that). The wordmay is used to indicate a course of action permissible within the limits of the standard (may equalsis permitted to). The wordcan is used for statements of possibility and capability, whether material, physical, or causal (can equals is able to).

Precision is key to fairness because it forms the basis of mutual pre round prep- that means permissibility and counterplans affirm. AND Obligation ground flows aff- an action by definition has to be permissible if it’s obligatory, so the negative must only impact offense to proving a prohibition. Otherwise the negative can coopt 6 minutes of AC offense and say the AC negates.

# 1AR T FLs

Extend Common Usage affirms- Merriam-Webster[[14]](#footnote-14) defines prioritize as “to list or rate (as projects or goals) in order of priority” so prioritizing environmental protection over resource extraction means regarding environmental protection as a more important goal than resource extraction- that’s also the Nebel definition- a specific policy doesn’t reflect a change in beliefs. O/W

A. text functions as side constraint on what counts as topic lit or ground in the first place, the correct interp of the resolution also constrains what counts as deserved strategy and education

B. more accessible- first thing everyone searches for definition is a dictionary, whereas not everyone reads hyper specific portions of the topic literature

C. strength of link- common usage 100% flows aff- it’s the first entry on 9 different dictionaries. This means even if topic lit outweighs in the abstract, strength of link determines the size of the impact

D. fair distribution of arguments is useless unless debaters can predict those arguments going into the round

E. net preferable- distribution of “ground” is still decent under my interp, but his interp is totally unpredictable so my interp combines the best of both worlds

Extend the B point- predictable limits- too many plans and counterplans and disads under his interp since there are over 100 developing countries and multiple extractive countries- a change in beliefs implies the only aff plan is the strongest instance of a belief change- that’s Nebel 2. O/W

A. infinite research burdens- I have to do a thousand times the work to gain reciprocal access to the ballot, which is an insurmountable out of round skew

B. predictability- too many affs means ambush debating and aff’s from the farthest of the lit- controls the link to his impacts because debaters never access the benefits of his interp

C. clash- every round is two ships passing in the night since there’s no incentive to engage other positions- controls the link to the education voter because we don’t think critically

# 1AR Meta Theory

A. Interpretation: If the negative advances multiple prefiat voting issues, such as reading theory and a prefiat criticism with a distinct role of the ballot, then the negative must weigh between them in the 1NC or explicitly delineate which prefiat impact comes first

B. Violation

C. Standards

1. Strat skew- these arguments are functionally aprioris because they are two completely independent links on the higher layer- offense on theory has no interaction with offense on the kritik so I can’t leverage any arguments I make in the 1AR against both layers. He can kick my best responses to either, which A. decreases clash and critical thinking B. turns his criticism- proves it’s a gimmick he doesn’t care about, which skews 1AR time allocation and strategy. Saying I can weigh is nonsense- the 6 minute 2NR means he can collapse to whatever he’s ahead on and then go for both, and it’s always net preferable under competing interps to weigh for me. Strategy is key to fairness because I can’t win the round without a reasonable understanding of it.

D. X-apply the voter, this comes first:

1. Meta theory indicts the fairness of the original interp- you don’t know whether T is true or not because I am prevented form engaging that debate

2. side constraint on prefiat- if engaging he ballot in alternate ways is a good thing, it shouldn’t be done in a contradictory way- even if prefiat comes first in the abstract, theory frames acceptable practices for criticism

3. temporal skew- even if the round was unfair in the 1NC, he still accessed arguments he claims are excluded and demonstrated a strategy- his abuse is worse because it prevents me from winning the round going forward

4. Neg abuse is always worse- aff abuse checks back the 7-4, 6-3 time skew and NC’s ability to adapt- I have to choose a stance on something, so don’t punish me for having to set ground

# 1AR AFF Choice

A. Interpetation: The negative must accepts the aff’s choice of paradigm- that refers to the role of the ballot

B. Violation

C. Standards

Ground AFC preserves 100% of the 1AC because I'm forced to speak first and define a starting point for debate, so changing the framework moots 6 minutes of AC offense. Framework contestation makes the 1AC meaningless because the question is now what we should be debating about. Moreover, switch side debate solves and link turns his offense- afc creates a permanent space for framework exploration and inculcates multiple perspectives by forcing debaters to debate under different frameworks. It increases depth and clash by bracketing discussion to issues under a framework, as opposed to between frameworks. Ground is key to fairness because equal access to offense determines access to the ballot.

# CX F/O Explanation

This is not the fallacy of origin- the claim is not those rights have to be protected only because they are logical prerequisite- they are a logical prereq because they justify the state’s existence, it would be unjustified if it don’t respect those rights, so it follows the state must respect those rights. There’s no fallacy of origin- that really says the basis of justification no longer supports the claim, Ex. Marriage- used to be sexist, but since it is no longer sexist it’s irrelevant that it used to be. The justification acts all the way down- it’s still relevant. It’s a logical prior but also necessary for state to be justified at all.

# 1AR FW Weighing

### Constitutivism

Here’s the interaction with util:

A. Normativity, as a guide to behavior, is obligatory for all agents, so it must prevent agents from being able to rationally reject its principles- that’s Gewirth 1

B. util is contingent on factors agents can disagree on, such as desires – this should be rejected since it cannot ground a view any agent must accept – Gewirth 2

C. err aff on the framework debate because the normative structure of action is formulated from precepts that are true of all moral theories regardless of their content

Outweighs:

A. Reversibility- an agent cannot fail to adhere to their constitutive aim without loosing their agency, since to be an agent is just to see yourself as the cause of your own actions. Thus inconsistency with constitutivism forecloses the possibility of being an agent.

B. Inescapable—two warrants here, the number one is to engage in any enterprise is ipso facto to engage in agency- to merely reflect rationally is agency, 2. Standing outside the conception of agency doesn’t work with what it means to be an agent- a chess player can criticize chess but to criticize one’s agency is to accept agency- that’s Ferrero

Four impacts here

1. I control the link to instantiation of his framework- to merely reflect about his standard is an act of agency

2. Probability- what distinguishes humans from animals is that humans actions are instances of intentional agency, not merely the product of impulses or desires. We know that humans are distinct from animals, so that requires a different constitutive aim

3. Solves back schmagency and skepticism- you can escape the game of chess but you’re still an agent- to reflect and question your agency is an act of agency

4. Motivation- constitutivism provides non-optional reasons for acting, so it ensures a motivational force internal to the concept of being an agent

### A2 Actor Specificity

A. Extend Gewrith 3- my framework links to actor specificity. The state any democracy must thus protect agents’ rights to freedom and well-being since the rights justify and exist before the state. Strength of link determines size of impact- I have mitigation on his link to actor specific, my own link to actor specificity, so even if actor specificity outweighs my metastandards in a vacuum, I access the best of both.

B. Motivational- agents wouldn’t act in accordance with a moral theory if its justifications appeal to something external to themselves, since saying the state must use this moral theory simply begs the question- it allows them to question why. Practical reasoning however is internal to all agents, represented in self evident actions.

### A2 Personhood

A. I control uniqueness- the decision making process implies that desires are mediated external principle – you can choose among them. This doesn’t require some deep view of personhood. Korsgaard

The second element of this pragmatic unity is the unity implicit in the standpoint from which you deliberate and choose. It may be that what actually happens when you make a choice is that the strongest of your conflicting desires wins. But that is not the way you think of it when you deliberate. **When you deliberate, it is as if there were something over and above all your desires, something that is** you, and that **chooses which one to act on. The idea that you choose among your conflicting desires,** rather than just waiting to see which one wins, suggests that you have reasons for or against acting on them. And it is these reasons, rather than the desires themselves. which are expressive of your will**,** The strength of a desire may be counted by you as a reason for acting on it but this is different from its simply winning. This means that there is some principle or way of choosing that you regard as expressive of yourself and that provides reasons that regulate your choices among your desires. **To identify with such a principle or way of choosing is to be “a law to yourself,’** and to be unified as such **This does not require that your agency be located in a separately existing entity or involve a deep meta-physical fact. Instead, it is a practical necessity imposed upon you by the nature of the deliberative standpoint**

Therefore, a stable practical identity is not a prerequisite

B. Hijacks his links- Even if our identity could be fragmented, that would only reduce to desires if you already thought that desires and wants are at the core of a moral theory. However reasons are at the core of a moral theory since the structure of a reason is always the same even if our identity shifts; an abstract theory like deontology wouldn’t take the individual perspective into account since it dictates general principles that are not contingent on personal identity so only my framework can solve for his account of personhood.

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